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Abstract
We formalize and extend George Stigler’s famous article “The division of labor is limited
by the extent of the market.” We emphasize economies of scale in intermediate goods
production as a determinant of ﬁrm boundaries and vertical control. We show that there
are potential coordination failures which may prevent eﬃcient vertical disintegration, and
we discuss how these might be either overcome or used to the advantage of incumbent ﬁrms.
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George Stigler published in 1951 a remarkable paper on Adam Smith’s famous theorem,
“The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.”1 Stigler’s paper is regularly
cited, but it focuses on the cost functions of perfectly competitive ﬁrms whereas most recent
vertical integration theory focuses on game theoretic models of vertical foreclosure.
Our goal is to clarify Stigler’s reasoning and present a model of vertical integration and
disintegration that preserves Stigler’s emphasis on perfect competition and cost functions.
In large part, we integrate the analysis of an older paper, Young’s (1928) pathbreaking
study of the same subject. We will obtain only some of Stigler’s results from our model,
and we will argue that the remaining results require additional elements beyond a group of
identical, perfectly competitive ﬁrms.
Stigler’s paper consists of three separate and largely independent stand-alone models.
The ﬁrst we will call the Division of Labor model, and it addresses Adam Smith’s conjecture.
Stigler asks whether the division of labor will be the source of ﬁrm-level economies of scale
that would bring about a monopoly in each and every sector of the economy. He concludes
that there are always diseconomies of scale in some of the processes carried out by the ﬁrm,
and these prevent monopolies from occurring.
The second model we call the Process model. Stigler looks at a ﬁrm as an organized
set of separate and distinct processes, thus introducing a classical dimension to the neo-
classical production function. He models the conventional neoclassical cost functions as the
additively separable sum of the ﬁrm’s various individual activities. The approach is best
conceived as an eﬀort to bridge neoclassical analysis with team production (Becker and
Murphy 1992). As shown by de Fontenay et al. (2004), it explains some ﬂaws in treatments
of economies of scale and scope (Panzar, 1989) as well as transaction costs (Williamson,
1985).
Stigler develops his Life Cycle Theory of vertical integration, what his paper is best
known for, in the third stand-alone model. Describing ﬁrms in terms of a life cycle made
up of three stages, he studies what may bring about vertical integration or disintegration in
each of the transition periods between those phases. In the initial stage, vertical integration
1A proposition Lowry (1879) traces back to the Oeconomicus by Xenophon. Kelly (1997) argues that the
extent of the market itself is a function of factors such as the transportation and communication infrastructure
that makes it possible to increase the extent of the market.
2is inescapable because the ﬁrm has to carry out a number of activities that may not be
available on the market. In the following stage, as the market matures, those activities are
carried out by other ﬁrms that specialize in them. The outcome of the transition between
those two stages is a gradual disintegration of the original ﬁrms. In the last transition
phase, as the ﬁrm shrinks relative to the rest of the economy, vertical integration begins
to reemerge. The Life Cycle model essentially reformulates the Process model in a quasi-
dynamic form, using the dynamic structure to go around the static monopoly problem
that was established in the ﬁrst framework. This part of Stigler’s paper has been reviewed
extensively and continues to receive the most attention. Stigler’s result is usually cited and
set aside as it conﬂicts with the bulk of today’s vertical integration literature (Joskow 2005).
We show here that the conﬂict may not be as real as apparent. Conventional analyses of
vertical integration tend to be short run (Williamson, 1985), and, on occasion, medium run
(Perry 1989), while Stigler’s framework is closer to Adam Smith’s long-run perspective, one
that is more appropriate for policy formulation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss Stigler’s Division
of Labor model and the questions it raises. Section 3 presents a formal model based on
Stigler’s Process model. In section 4 we turn to his Life Cycle model, and in section 6
concludes.
2 Economies of Scale Versus Economies of Specialization
We show that Stigler’s core issue – explaining why monopolies do not arise in Adam Smith’s
framework – is not a problem in the ﬁrst place. Adam Smith’s conjecture had already been
established by Young (1928). Stigler’s concern reﬂects a confusion between economies of
specialization associated with the division of labor and economies of scale that are central
to modern theories of the ﬁrm. There are not necessarily links between the two, at least at
the ﬁrm level, and for this reason monopoly need not arise.
The concept of economies of scale (its foundations are discussed in de Fontenay et
al. 2003 and de Fontenay et al. 2004) has always been problematic since it seems to lead
inevitably to monopoly. Marshall (1920) stressed an aggregate concept of economies of scale
with both internal and external economies rather than ﬁrm-level economies of scale. Later
economists focused ﬁrst on monopoly, then industry structure, and ﬁnally game theory to
3explain industries with market power.
In Stigler’s approach, the problem is pushed down from the ﬁrm level to the level of
processes within the ﬁrm. He applies a conventional technology set (Mas-Colell et al. 1995)
at a disaggregated level in the spirit of Adam Smith and his pin factory. The kind of
processes Stigler lists to illustrate his approach includes processes such as “purchasing and
storing materials,...storing and selling outputs, extending credit to buyers...” as well as
the process of “transforming materials into semiﬁnished products” (pg. 187). Eﬀectively,
Stigler’s ﬁrm is an entity that reﬂects an organized aggregation of distinct and separable
activities that may correspond, say, to the units of its organization.
Stigler argues that the technological characteristics of those various processes are such
that some may have substantial economies of scale. For instance, if we were consider-
ing a local telephone operator, most people think that the access network has substantial
economies of scale while many of those same people are more at ease with the idea that those
economies are not particularly signiﬁcant at the retail level. Stigler, just like Williamson
(1985), does not see separability as a signiﬁcant problem, a conclusion that is supported by
some studies (e.g., Jacobides 2004) as well as by the high level of outsourcing one observes
today (Feenstra 1998). Stigler observes that each of these cost functions will have their
own technological characteristics, some, possibly, with signiﬁcant scale economies, some,
possibly, with diseconomies of scale. Thus, any economies of scale one may observe at the
level of the ﬁrm are nothing more than ex post measures that need not describe in an ex
ante manner the most eﬃcient organization of the technology set.
This kind of approach was criticized in Young’s (1928) key contribution:
“the principal economies which manifest themselves in increasing returns are economies
of capitalistic or roundabout methods of production ...these economies lie under our eyes,
but we may miss them if we try to make a large-scale production ...as contrasted with large
production any more than an incident in the general process by which increasing returns
are secured and if accordingly we look too much at the individual ﬁrms ...the economies of
roundabout methods depend upon the extent of the market – and that, of course, is what
we discuss under the head of increasing returns.”
Young argues that it is improper to equate economies of specialization created by the
division of labor with economies of scale at the intermediate good level. After a long hiatus,
economists such as Yang (2001), Becker and Murphy (1992), Brown (1992), and Robertson
4and Alston (1992) are examining the diﬀerence between the two. Those analyses show how
the division of labor generates, as noted by Young, a downward sloping aggregate output
curve, a curve that might be adequate at times at the industry level. But that curve does
not tell us anything about the eﬃcient ﬁrm size. A lower point along the curve could just as
well be associated with smaller units of production as with larger ones. Stigler’s monopoly
dilemma arose because he confused this ex post residual curve for the economies of scale of
a neoclassical production function. Yang (2001) develops this more formally:
“the system of production ...seems to exhibit economies of scale ...But economies
of specialization diﬀer from economies of scale. First, economies of specialization are
individual-speciﬁc and activity-speciﬁc ...Second, the individual-speciﬁc time constraint
and individual-speciﬁc system of multiple production functions are essential for deﬁning
the concept of economies of specialization.” (p. 46)
To incorporate these insights into a model, we adopt elements of Stigler, Young, and
Yang (2001). From Stigler, we take the Process model, which could also be referred to as
“Stiglerian specialization.” The key to that model is that if more labor (or another resource)
is allocated to an intermediate process, it produces a more-than-proportionate increase in
output of the intermediate good.
From Young, we take the idea that these intermediate processes are non-seperable, so
that intermediate scale economies do not automatically result in aggregate scale economies.
Indeed, for a given division of labor, aggregate diseconomies of scale seem more likely. Thus,
the transformation of labor into intermediate good x may be subject to scale economies,
and likewise with intermediate good y, but the ﬁnal good production function f(x,y) is
subject to diseconomies of scale. Following Young’s logic, the only way to avoid these ﬁnal
good diseconomies of scale is to reconﬁgure the technology to include more processes. Thus,
if an additional intermediate good z were created, then f(x,y,z) > f(x,y) even when the
initial labor input is the same. This is the case of “economies of roundabout production”
or “Smithian specialization.”
From Yang, we use the insight that these economies of scale and specialization are only
determinants of how factors should be allocated, not vertical integration. The decision to
vertically integrate is based on various organizational systems that we call the “commons.”
The commons includes property rights, residual claims, contracting, governance, and so
forth. Models of these systems include Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Grossman and Hart
5(1986), and others. A complete analysis of the commons is beyond the scope of this paper.
Here we use Coasian transactions costs as a convenient shorthand for the organization of
the commons.2 In fact, we interpret Williamson’s body of work as an extended discussion
of why this shorthand works well. We acknowledge that transactions costs do not always
equate to property rights based models (Whinston 2001), but we believe they serve well for
our purposes.
3 Model
In this section we present a model that addresses the previous discussion. Following on
that discussion, ﬁrms in our model do have intermediate scale economies, but they do not
have aggregate scale economies. Thus, no ﬁrm can expand to create a monopoly, but there
are incentives for ﬁrms to engage in Stiglerian specialization and trade with one another. If
there are limits on the number of ﬁrms that can enter (e.g. regulation or high ﬁxed costs
that create integer constraints), then the ﬁrms will earn Ricardian rents (or quasi-rents
depending on the source of the entry barrier).
We begin with a simple case of vertical integration, and then consider the more complex
case of specialization.
3.1 Vertical Integration
Firms produce a ﬁnal good q. We can think of this as a consumer good. Production of
the ﬁnal good is subject to decreasing returns to scale because of marketing and/or quality
problems associated with large scale. Each ﬁrm is a perfect competitor that takes the price
of q, pq, as given.
Firms need two intermediate goods, x and y, to produce output q according to the
production function q = f(x,y).
Assumption: Final good production is subject to decreasing returns to scale. αf(x,y) >
f(αx,αy) for α > 1.
Each ﬁrm has a quantity of critical resources L available to allocate between producing
2This is also Yang’s approach.
6intermediate goods x and y. The number of ﬁrms thus ﬁxes the total supply of L available
in the industry.3 The ﬁrm allocates Ly resources to y production and L − Ly resources to
x production. Assume that the intermediate production functions are the same: y = g(Ly)
and x = g(L − Ly).4
Assumption: Intermediate goods production is subject to increasing returns to scale.
αg(l) < g(αl) for α > 1.
Since L is a ﬁnite resource, the intermediate scale economies create a tradeoﬀ which is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Intermediate Goods Production
The ﬁrm chooses Ly optimally according to the cost-minimizing ﬁrst order condition
d
dLy
f(g(L − Ly),g(Ly)) = f1g1(L − Ly) + f2g1(Ly)




v denote the optimal production of the intermediate goods. Note that supply
is perfectly inelastic because each ﬁrm uses up its entire endowment of L.
Let market inverse demand be P(Qd) where Qd is the total quantity of the ﬁnal good




3Using the letter “L” for this variable suggests that the critical resources are specialized labor, but in
fact specialized capital is probably more relevant in many industries.
4We believe this assumption does not aﬀect the results in an interesting way, but it does economize on
notation and complexity.





Now we modify the above model to allow the ﬁrms to specialize ` a la Stigler in producing
input y or x. Assuming all ﬁrms still produce the ﬁnal good q, Stiglerian specialization
requires them to trade inputs with each other in order to satisfy the requirements of the
production function.
Following Yang (2001), we add a “melting iceberg” transaction cost for factors traded
between ﬁrms. For example, if a ﬁrm purchases 10 units of y, it may ﬁnd that only 9
units actually contribute to production. The other unit (or at least the cost of it) can
be thought of as melting away, representing a transaction cost. We use the parameter
k ∈ [0,1] to represent the degree of transaction cost. In the example we just gave, k = 0.9.
A higher value of k means lower transaction cost, since more of the input is actually used
in production.
3.2.1 Firm-Level Optimization
Consider a y specialist. It uses all of its resources to produce y (Ly = L). It sells some of
the y on the market (ys) and uses the rest for production of q. It must buy the x factor in
the intermediate goods market (xd). Then its production function is
qy = f(kxd,g(Ly) − ys)
and its proﬁt function is
pqqy + pyys − pxxd
Assuming an interior solution, the the y-specialist solves:
kpqf1 − px = 0 − pqf2 + py = 0
Denote the solutions to this system by x∗
d and y∗
s.
Other than the transaction cost k, these ﬁrst order conditions are identical to those of
a standard perfectly competitive ﬁrm. If, for example, py were to rise, the ﬁrm would cut
back on internal use of y. But since the ﬁrm is a y specialist, it would still produce the
same total quantity of y and sell more of it into the intermediate goods market.
8For an x specialist the problem is reversed but otherwise identical due to the symmetry
assumption. An x specialist’s optimal purchases and sales are y∗
d and x∗
s. However, the
presence of transaction costs introduces a wedge between the factor intensities of the two
types of ﬁrms:5
Proposition 1: A y specialist produces q with a more y-intensive process than an x
specialist.
Proof: Follows directly from the k term in the ﬁrst order condition which adds to the cost
of xd from a y-specialist’s point of view.
Finally, we can show that for any given intermediate good prices, every ﬁrm will choose
Stiglerian specialization:
Proposition 2: All ﬁrms specialize in producing intermediate good x or y. No ﬁrm will
produce a mixture of the two intermediate goods.
Proof: Consider a “mixed ﬁrm,” i.e. one that produces some x and some y internally but
also participates in the intermediate good market. Without loss of generality, let the ﬁrm
produce and sell y and produce and buy x.
The mixed ﬁrm allocates Ly resources to y production and L − Ly resources to x pro-
duction. Its proﬁt function is
pqf(g(L − Ly) + kxd,g(Ly) − ys) + pyys − pxxd
Taking ﬁrst order conditions, and assuming an interior solution, the mixed ﬁrm solves:
−f1g0(L − Ly) + f2g0(Ly) = 0 kpqf1 − px = 0 − pqf2 + py = 0
The last two ﬁrst order conditions indicate that the mixed ﬁrm chooses the same total
quantities of x and y for ﬁnal good production as a y-specialist ﬁrm. Substituting the






But g is an increasing convex function, so this solution is not a maximum. 
5An interesting extension would allow the quality of ﬁnal good q to vary with the input mix. For example,
x might represent cable television content and y might represent picture quality.
93.2.2 Market Equilibrium
Let the number of ﬁrms of each type be Nx and Ny. Then demand equals supply in the





s Qd = Nxq∗
x + Nyq∗
y
These can be solved simultaneously to give the equilibrium factor prices of x and y given
the price of ﬁnal output pq. Now we can ﬁnd the proﬁts of the two types of ﬁrms.
More y ﬁrms decreases the price of y relative to x and therefore tends to decrease y ﬁrm
proﬁts. More ﬁrms of both types increases overall q supply, which can increase or decrease
industry proﬁts depending on the elasticity of demand.
4 Equilibrium Conﬁgurations
4.1 Specialization
Now the question that concerns us is whether a ﬁrm is better oﬀ in the vertical integration
setting or the Stiglerian specialization setting. Let a conﬁguration (Nv) or (Nx,Ny) give
the number of ﬁrms of each type (vertically integrated, x specialist, and y specialist; by
Proposition 2 hybrids will not occur).
Proposition 3: If f(·,·) is homothetic, Nx





and k is suﬃciently large, then specialization with trade is eﬃcient.
Proof: The total supply of x and y is determined by Nx and Ny under specialization. Each
specialized ﬁrm chooses the same factor intensities when k = 1, and by homotheticity these
factor intensities are optimal since they are the same as a vertically integrated ﬁrm would
choose. Therefore, every ﬁrm is operating at an optimal factor intensity and with more of
each factor, yet no more critical resources are being used. 
If the conditions above are not met – e.g. if transaction costs are large or the number
of ﬁrms of each type makes the factor mix is suboptimal under specialization – then the
results could be reversed.
While this proposition is good for society, it may prove small comfort to the ﬁrms.
Depending on the elasticities of demand and supply, the new lower-price, higher-quantity
10equilibrium may either increase or decrease producer surplus. Indeed the current move
toward outsourcing seems to be accompanied by decreased producer surplus in some in-
dustries. In the remainder of this paper, we will assume that demand is elastic so that
specialization is potentially proﬁtable for the ﬁrms. For simplicity, we will also assume that
the optimal factor mix is equal proportions of x and y, so that the optimal specialization
conﬁguration will have equal numbers of ﬁrms of each type.
4.2 Equilibrium Vertical Integration Conﬁgurations
Suppose that acquiring the critical resources L requires investment of a ﬁxed cost F. A
conﬁguration is an equilibrium vertical integration conﬁguration if an additional ver-
tically integrated ﬁrm could not make a positive proﬁt. Conﬁguration (Nv) is an equilibrium
vertical integration conﬁguration if:
πv(Nv) ≥ F > πv(Nv + 1)
The operating proﬁts of the ﬁrms in conﬁguration (Nv) would be determined by perfectly














Figure 2: Operating Proﬁts as a Function of Transaction Costs
Proposition 4: There exists a unique equilibrium vertical integration conﬁguration.
Proof: Demand is downward-sloping and the quantity produced by any one ﬁrm is limited
by L, thus revenue must decrease as the market quantity supplied rises. 
114.3 Equilibrium Specialization Conﬁgurations
Now consider specialization. Conﬁguration (Nx,Ny) is an equilibrium specialization
conﬁguration (ESC) if:
πx(Nx,Ny) ≥ F > πx(Nx + 1,Ny)
πy(Nx,Ny) ≥ F > πy(Nx,Ny + 1)
πx(Nx,Ny) ≥ F > πx(Nx + 1,Ny + 1)
πy(Nx,Ny) ≥ F > πy(Nx + 1,Ny + 1)
The ﬁrst two conditions consider asymmetric conﬁgurations where there are more of one
type of ﬁrm than the other. For example, with more x ﬁrms than y ﬁrms, there is an
assymetry in the intermediate goods market: relative to the optimal factor mix, there is a
surplus of x and a shortage of y. Thus, the y ﬁrms earn additional quasi-rents while the x
ﬁrms earn less. Because proﬁts are lower due to the suboptimal factor mix, it is possible
that both of the ﬁrst two conditions are met but that entry by one ﬁrm of each type would
nonetheless increase proﬁts. Thus, the third and fourth conditions are also required.
Deﬁnition: A specialization conﬁguration is proportionate if the ratio of x to y ﬁrms is
the same as the optimal marginal rate of transformation in a vertically integrated ﬁrm.







in which there are the same total
number of ﬁrms as under vertical integration, but they specialize. Assuming the production
function meets the conditions in Proposition 3, the operating proﬁt would be represented








librium since operating proﬁts are higher under specialization. We illustrate the situation
in Figure 3 for the case where n additional ﬁrms of each type are viable at k = 1.
4.4 Static Industry Conﬁguration Games
We have now deﬁned equilibrium vertical integration conﬁgurations and equilibrium spe-
cialization conﬁgurations. It remains to analyze which type of equilibrium will actually





 x (Nv + n,Nv + n)
 v(Nv)   F
Figure 3: ESC has n More Firms of Each Type
(N∗
v) and the equilibrium specialization conﬁguration is (N∗
x,N∗
y). For example, for k given
by the vertical dashed line in Figure 4, the relevant conﬁgurations are (4) and (3,2). (With





 x(2,2) =  y(2,2)
 y(3,2)
F
 x(3,3) =  y(3,3)
Figure 4: Two Equilibrium Conﬁgurations
Either of these is a Nash equilibrium, in the sense that no ﬁrm can proﬁtably deviate
by a unilateral decision to enter or exit the market or to vertically integrate or specialize.
Conﬁguration (3,2) is socially eﬃcient in that it involves more output for lower variable
and ﬁxed costs. By our assumption that ﬁnal good demand is elastic, we also know that
(3,2) brings in greater revenue to the industry as a whole. However, (3,2) is much more
desirable to the 2 y specialists than to the 3 x specialists.
We can imagine many diﬀerent mechanisms by which the actual conﬁguration would
be chosen. To begin analyzing these, let us take a simple, static game. Suppose that
the industry has Nv vertically integrated ﬁrms due to past conditions. Suppose there is
13an unexpected reduction in transaction costs that creates a new equilibrium specialization
conﬁguration (Nx,Ny). Given our assumptions, this conﬁguration is proportionate, and if
the optimal factor proportions are symmetric then the conﬁguration is also symmetric.
If Nx < Nv and Ny < Nv, then the incumbent ﬁrms cannot all specialize in the same
intermediate good and still stay in the industry. Thus, a shift to the specialization conﬁgu-
ration always involves a reallocation of L from x to y production or from y to x production
in incumbent ﬁrms; and may involve both types of reallocation occurring at diﬀerent ﬁrms.
Thus, it is not possible to move to specialization unless some incumbent ﬁrms are willing
to “mothball” or “abandon” their capabilities in one or the other intermediate good. The
extent of such mothballing would depend on risks of future entry, the ease with which the
mothballed facilities could be restarted, and so forth. If incumbents are not willing to
mothball, then the whole industry can be held away from the specialization equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
5.1 Stigler’s Questions
We can now look back at our model to answer the questions Stigler posed in his paper. The
ﬁrst question was why the division of labor does not ultimately lead to monopoly. In our
model, monopoly does not emerge in the ﬁnal good market because there are decreasing
returns to scale in assembling the intermediate goods. This is very similar to the answer
that Stigler gave, in which he claimed that some processes used in producing ﬁnal output
would be subject to decreasing returns. One way of looking at our model is that we have
included just such a process, namely the ﬁnal combination of intermediate goods.
But this does not answer the question of monopoly in the intermediate goods market.
Stigler does not provide any clear answer on this point. In our model, we have at least
formalized the assumption by stating that there is a critical resource L that constrains the
ﬁrm. But if one imagines an extension to the model wherein L can be increased over time,
and if one maintains the assumption of never-ending intermediate economies of scale, then
it is clear that the lowest cost conﬁguration would involve one very large x producer, one
very large y producer, and a host of ﬁnal good producers that buy both x and y in the
intermediate goods market. Of course, this immediately raises the question of how prices
are set in this market.
14We believe that the empirical evidence suggests that this assumption is about right.
In the early years of an industry, the intermediate goods producers cannot grow large
enough to create a monopoly. But if an industry produces substantially the same good
with substantially the same technology for a long enough period, it does appear that there
is a tendency toward consolidation. It seems that only antitrust enforcement prevents the
last few mergers that would support a monopoly.
Stigler’s Process model concerns the particular pattern in which ﬁrms specialize. We
have formalized that model here. In particular, we have argued that intermediate scale
economies create the incentive to specialize. This is close to Stigler’s result. However, we
do not ﬁnd any reason to believe that the process by which this specialization occurs is
eﬃcient. Since specialization requires the cooperation of multiple ﬁrms, it is generally not
possible to rule out multiple equilibria. Indeed it appears to us that strictly speaking, a
purely vertically integrated industry is always a Nash equilibrium since no one ﬁrm can
proﬁtably specialize on its own.
We plan to extend the model in several ways. The most important is to examine the
idea of an equilibrium conﬁguration more closely. We need to consider how such equilibria
come about in a dynamic process and whether they are stable. Also, since specialization can
sometimes reduce producer surplus, we want to examine when an industry can successfully
resist it and when competitive pressures force specialization.
Also, the model currently rests on a ﬁxed endowment of critical resources (L) per ﬁrm.
One would expect that ﬁrms would seek to change this endowment, but it would also
seem reasonable that the endowment cannot be changed instantaneously. We will use an
adjustment model similar to the one used in Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) in a paper
on endogenous mergers in an industry. We expect that the pattern of specialization will
profoundly inﬂuence investment in critical resources.
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